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Some Plain Talk About the Louisiana
General Property Tax
JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM* AND FERDINAND M. LoB**
Perhaps this is not the time to be agitating the state revenue
waters; the Federal revenue problems created by the war are cer-
tainly of such magnitude as to overshadow the state and local
aspects of the total revenue picture. As a matter of fact, however,
revenue problems of the Federal Government definitely aggra-
vate the tax problems of the state and local units of government
and careful reconsideration of the subject seems imperative if in-
telligent adjustment to post-war conditions is to be made. It may
well be that a thoroughgoing overhauling of the Louisiana gen-
eral property tax should await the victory. In the meantime, a
minimum program of action would entail a very thorough study
of the state and local revenue systems in their social and eco-
nomic as well as legal aspects in order that, when the appropriate
time comes, sound modifications may be made in our tax policy
through the medium of well-drawn constitutional provisions and
tax legislation.
The Bar of Louisiana takes great pride in our codification of
the law governing ordinary civil relationships. At the present time
the legislature has just adopted a bill codifying the substantive
criminal law of the state. Yet in the field of public law, including
taxation, we are woefully backward in using the code idea. The
administrative code and the fiscal code of 1940, which have re-
cently been held unconstitutional,1 might be considered steps in
this direction although the former does not contain in itself a
complete statement of administrative powers, duties and proced-
ures but relies heavily upon reference to other statutes.
Any lawyer who can see beyond the end of his nose must have
observed the tremendous development of public law on the state
as well as the Federal level. Much of this law is new and tenta-
tive. But this cannot be said of the main body of state and local
"Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
** Member of Louisiana Bar.
1. The case is as yet unreported.
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tax law. Instead of adopting a well-organized tax code, as has
the Federal Congress, we have continued to rock along with a
great diversity of tax statutes heavily freighted with obsolete and
overlapping provisions, complicated by the usual general repeal-
ing clauses in later acts, which leave doubts as to just what earlier
law has been wiped out and which represent, at the very best, a
patched and re-patched crazy-quilt representing superficial and
inadequate efforts to adjust the tax laws to new conditions. These
observations are undoubtedly true of the statutes concerning the
general property tax. We do not have much ground for declaim-
ing about the virtues of codification so long as such a situation
exists. Surely, if there is any field of the law where orderly, sys-
tematic legislative expression of the governing rules is needed,
that domain is the difficult and very important realm of taxation.
We would say most emphatically, therefore, that Louisiana
should have a carefully drawn revenue code to replace the statu-
tory mess which now constitutes the bulk of our tax law. But we
would say with equal emphasis that the proper procedure is not
to turn on the constitutional and statutory materials with a view
to drafting a code. That would be altogether superficial. There
should first be made a very careful and thorough study of our tax
system in all of the important aspects affecting tax policy in order
that the substance of the code shall measure up.
But this is not all. Tax study and research are not matters
which can be disposed of by one immense, inclusive effort or even
by recurrent attacks. An adequate study would, it is true, provide
the basis for a new start in Louisiana. It would, however, be only
the beginning. Revenue problems are dynamic; they call for con-
tinuous, unflagging inquiry and analysis. It is accordingly our
belief that the state should establish a public research agency
with adequate personnel and financial support to perform this
important continuing function. The unenlightened manner in
which war-time revenue matters have been dealt with at the cur-
rent session of the Legislature is far from encouraging but that
situation emphatically does not deter us from speaking our piece.
The requisite primary over-all revenue study was projected
by a group of interested faculty people on the campus of Louis-
iana State University over a year ago. It was thought that the
members of that group could make substantial progress on the
work by devoting to it such time as they could find while in the
performance of their regular duties, even though independent
financial support was not in sight. The plan was projected as a
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large-scale venture in cooperative research. A principal reason
why we have been unable to proceed in this wise is that war-time
public service and the armed forces have drawn heavily upon the
faculty's manpower. They have decimated the research group
and left those still at the University with increased regular bur-
dens which absorb time that might otherwise be devoted to re-
search. 2 Thus it is that only a modest volume of work has been
done on the project.
With the limited resources at hand we have tried to make
some headway upon the basic tax in the system, the general prop-
erty tax. The fruits of a special study of utility property assess-
ment are presented in a companion paper in this number of the
Review. The basis for the more general critique of the general
property tax, which follows in the present paper, is a preliminary
study of legal and administrative materials. We believe that our
inquiry proceeded far enough to enable us, with confidence, to in-
dict, on numerous counts, the Louisiana general property tax as
semi-articulated in the constitution and tax laws and as admin-
istered by the tax authorities. Let not the reader suppose, how-
ever, that the discussion which follows is intended to be exhaus-
tive. It has no such pretensions. It is more a sampling treatment,
which should suffice to make and underscore the point that the
Louisiana general property tax presently is in a disgraceful state.
There remains the challenge to the state's responsible leader-
ship to see to it that ways and means are provided for the prose-
cution of the essential primary study to thorough completion.
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO TAXATION
Exemptions constitute the focus of this branch of our inquiry.
Over the years there has been written into our organic law a
formidable list of exemptions." The value of exempt property
must be tremendous. A reliable statement of the relative value of
2. One, possibly both, of the writers will be in the service soon,
3. Some thirty-six types of exemption are set out in La. Const. of 1921,
Art. X, § 4, and Arts. XIV and XVI, including both real estate and tangible,
as well as intangible, personal property. The principal classes of corporeal
property on the list are public property, property devoted to charitable,
educational and religious purposes, new homes (for three years), home-
steads (up to $2,000 of value), industrial plants covered by exemption con-
tracts, household property to the value of $1,000, motor vehicles (optional
as to municipal levies) and all livestock. Incorporeal property exemptions
include cash on hand or on deposit, loans or other obligations secured by
mortgage on property located exclusively in the state of Louisiana, policy
loans by life insurance companies to their policy holders and obligations of
the state or its political subdivisions.
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exempt and taxable properties would be very interesting data.4
It may be a matter of considerable significance that the electorate
in 1940 refused to renew the authority to exempt new industrial
construction and to add new items to the exemption list5
The exemption problem is quite complex. A variety of inter-
ests are served by this sort of dispensation. For obvious reasons
public property enjoys exemption. Property devoted to charit-
able uses, more or less akin to the functions of government,
claims like treatment. It is sought to nurture the family institu-
tion by fostering home ownership through the homestead exemp-
tion and the three-year exemption of new homes. Religion is
granted a state subsidy in the form of gratuitous public services
such as fire and police protection. The same in true as to new in-
dustrial development under exemption contracts made pursuant
to a constitutional provision that expired, as authority for new
contracts, in December, 1941.0 Oil and gas interests are tapped by
the severance tax to the exclusion of ad valorem taxation.7 A
number of special exemptions swells the list8
The legislature is not responsible for these heavy inroads into
the potential total tax base. Here, as in many other large matters
of policy, we have not .seen fit to entrust the power of decision to
the legislature. Instead, we have tried to lay down the law in the
constitution itself. One wonders what sort of job that body would
do were the electorate to repose more confidence in it and to re-
place the present system of sawed-off sixty-day biennial sessions
with a more ample legislative work schedule.
4. The Louisiana Tax Commission has reported that the total assessed
value of all classes of property in Louisiana in the year 1941 was $1,402,364,137
and that the total value of exempt real estate alone in all the parishes of the
state was $645,723,274.04 in 1941 or nearly half the assessed value of all taxable
property in Louisiana. Report of Louisiana Tax Commission (1940-1941)
106-107, 196-197. We have little doubt but that the total value of exempt prop-
erty exceeds the total assessed valuation. Add to that the fact that large
values enjoy actual exemption by mere failure to assess and we have a serious
situation.
5. The proposed constitutional amendment which failed of ratification at
the November, 1940, election was initiated by La. Act 399 of 1940.
6. The 1938 constitutional amendment (proposed by La. Act 37 of 1938),
which provided for tax exemption for new manufacturing establishments for
a period not exceeding ten years, authorized the state to enter into exemp-
tion contracts with new industries during a period of only three years from
the effective date of the amendment.
7. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 21. This section also puts a limit on valua-
tions of sulphur in place. The policy here is to substitute the severance tax
in whole or part for the property tax and it is required that some of the
severance tax proceeds be allocated to the parishes. The other local units of
government dependent on the property tax are, however, shown no such
solicitude.
8. See note 10, infra.
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Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution purports to lay
down an exclusive list of property tax exemptions.' That it tells
the whole story, however, is far from true. In the first place the
list is lengthened by special provisions found elsewhere in the
Constitution. For example, Section 22A of Article XIV of the
Constitution authorizes the Commission Council of the City of
New Orleans to exempt buildings and other structures in the
Vieux Carr6, having historical or architectural value, from mu-
nicipal and parochial taxes for any period of years which the
Commission Council may determine. 10 The supreme court, more-
over, has placed its imprimatur upon a distinctly left-handed type
of exemption, namely, legislative failure affirmatively to tax. The
court has decided that shares of corporate stock are not taxable
unless the legislature has expressly provided for their taxation. 1
As a result a tacit exemption not provided for by the Constitution
has been created simply by the failure of the legislature to tax
such property, although attempts of the legislature to create ex-
press tax exemptions not authorized by the Constitution have
been declared unconstitutional. 2 That the supreme court has been
correct in approving such exemptions by omission is open to seri-
ous question as has been previously indicated in the pages of this
review.18 Even more disconcerting is the wide sweep of adminis-
trative exemption. Thus, although certain types of personal prop-
erty, such as stock in trade and business furniture and fixtures,
generally appear on the assessors' rolls, most other personal prop-
erty is not listed in Louisiana, and, consequently, is not taxed.
9. It begins: "The following property, and no other, shall be exempt from
taxation."
10. Other provisions of Articles X, XIV and XVI of the Constitution
exempt from taxation various obligations of the City of New Orleans and of
other governmental agencies or subdivisions and certain special property such
as the bridge across the Mississippi at Natchez, constructed by the City of
Natchez, Mississippi. It is not evident why special exemptions of municipal
bonds are needed, in view of the general exemption of state and local obli-
gations provided by paragraph 3 of § 4 of Art. X of La. Const. of 1921. Surely
"obligations" would cover revenue and other special as well as general obli-
gations.
11. Chassaniol v. Board of Assessors of the Parish of Orleans, 120 La. 777,
45 So. 604 (1908). Allgeyer v. Board of Assessors, 121 La. 149, 46 So. 134 (1908).
See also Ficklen v. City of New Orleans, 147 La. 567, 85 So. 330 (1920). In these
cases the court was obviously trying to prevent double taxation. That con-
sideration is totally absent, however, in the case of stock in a corporation
which does not have substantial taxable property in the state.
12. City of New Orleans v. Louisiana Savings Bank and Safe Deposit Co.,
31 La. Ann. 826 (1879). See Southland Investment Co. v. Jeter, 171 La. 106,
109, 129 So. 722, 723 (1930) ; State ex rel. Porterie v. Housing Authority of New
Orleans, 190 La. 710, 749, 182 So. 725, 737, 738 (1938).
13. See Comment, Corporate Stock and the Louisiana General Property
Tax (1941) 4 LOUISANA LAW REVMW 110.
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The value of one's household goods in excess of $1,000 is tax-
able but no effort is made to assess such property. In mitigation
some assessors have insisted that they would be shot if they went
to people's homes to list their household personalty! That is a
lovely compliment to pay the gentle taxpayer. It is not to be
taken seriously. We have heard of no assessor fatalities in states
where such listing is a commonplace.
It may be said, therefore, that there are three classes of tax
exemptions in Louisiana: (1) constitutional exemptions, that is,
the exemptions specifically set out in the Constitution; (2) ju-
dicial exemptions or those created by the courts in interpreting
these constitutional provisions; and (3) administrative exemp-
tions, which are those created by the failure of the tax officials to
assess certain classes of property.
This is a thoroughly'unsatisfactory situation. There should
be no judicial nor administrative exemptions. As a matter of
policy it may be that some of the classes of property exempt in
such wise should enjoy that advantage by force of positive law.
Practice has so far departed from positive law that that condition
in itself calls strongly for a fresh and searching re-examination of
the whole subject. But it is the great accumulation of exemp-
tions, of one sort or another, which renders the need of thorough
reconsideration of exemption policy so pressing. It will be diffi-
cult to gain for a subject, so colored by sentimental, emotional
and selfish considerations, the calm, dispassionate treatment it
should receive. That may be sufficient reason for penny-poli-
ticians to back away from the subject but it only increases the
challenge to statesmanship.
There is not space to consider all the problems which have
arisen or might properly be raised with respect to the various
express constitutional exemptions and which should claim atten-
tion when the positive law is revised. It may be suggestive, how-
ever, to advert to some of the questions affecting public, religious,
educational and charitable properties.
"All public property" is exempted without qualification. Al-
though there are no Louisiana cases in point, the general rule in
other states is that if public property, the title to which is in a
public corporation, is expressly and unqualifiedly exempt from
taxation by the constitution or a statute, the property is exempt
irrespective of its use.14 On the other hand, if property is dedi-
14. For a collection of cases see II Cooley, Taxation (Nichols' 4th ed.
1924) 1421, § 680, n. 92 et seq. Note the North Carolina cases which, after
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cated to public use, even though title is not vested in the public,
it is also exempt from taxation according to the view embraced in
a majority of jurisdictions, including Louisiana." Furthermore, it
has been ruled that if the revenues from such property serve a
public purpose, the property itself is considered to be public
property and, as such, exempt from taxes.16
In the case of State ex rel. Porterie v. Housing Authority of
New Orleans 7 the Louisiana Supreme Court went so far as to
hold in a test case that the notes, bonds and other obligations of
the Housing Authority of New Orleans, a public agency, would,
when issued, be "public property" within the meaning of the ex-
emption provision, inasmuch as the legislature had declared such
obligations to be for a public purpose and to be public instru-
mentalities and, as such, to be exempt from taxation. This is
rather attenuated reasoning because, although the obligations are,
in a sense, public instrumentalities, once outstanding they would
plainly be private property if held by private owners. It would
have required less straining to have labeled the Authority a po-
litical subdivision and then rested the exemption upon Paragraph
3 of Section 4 of Article X, which exempts "obligations of the
State or its political subdivisions."
Since the title theory governs, property which has been ad-
judicated at tax sale to the state or to a municipality is beyond
the reach of taxation while so held, even though it is used for
public purposes only in the sense that it is being held in the pro-
cess of collecting public revenue.
Paragraph 2 of'Section 4 of Article X exempts from taxation
the property of religious, charitable and educational organizations
which is used for these purposes and is not leased for profit or in-
come. Here the sole test is the use to which the property is put
and ownership is not essential.'8 In interpreting this section the
much litigation, have converted a constitutional ownership test into a use
criterion. The cases are discussed by Coates, The Battle of Exemptions (1941)
19 N.C.L.Rev. 154, 167 et seq..
15. Anniston City Land Co. v. State, 160 Ala. 253, 48 So. 659 (1909); Kappa
Kappa Gamma House Association v. Pearcy, 92 Kan. 1020, 142 Pac. 294, 52
L.R.A. (N.S.) 995 (1914). See State ex rel. Cunningham v. Board of Assessors
of Parish of Orleans, 52 La. Ann. 223, 228, 26 So. 872, 875 (1898); Martin v.
Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 150 La. 157, 183, 90 So. 553, 562 (1922); II Coo-
ley, Taxation (Nichols' 4th ed. 1924) 1425, §§ 680, 682.
16. See Opinions of the Attorney General (1938-1940) 1135, relying on
Administrators of the Tulane Education Fund v. The Board of Assessors, 38
La. Ann. 292 (1886).
17. 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725 (1938).
18. Methodist Episcopal Church, South v. City of New Orleans, 107 La.
611, 32 So. 101 (1902); Opinions of the Attorney General (1922-1924) 755.
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Attorney General's office has been remarkable for the variety
and contrariety of the opinions it has produced. For example, al-
though there have been a number of opinions to the effect that use
rather than ownership is determinative, 9 on one occasion it was
said that the constitutional exemption applied only to property
actually owned by a charitable institution and not to property
under a different ownership even though it was being used, with-
out charge, exclusively by the charitable institution.20 Again, al-
though the Attorney General has ruled that property which was
leased for profit or income21 or which was not actually used for
church, charitable or school purposes 2 was subject to taxation
even though the income or revenue from such property was de-
voted exclusively to religious, charitable or educational purposes,
in another opinion,22 certain real estate belonging to the Ameri-
can Legion, which was let for non-charitable purposes, was de-
clared to be exempt from taxation because the revenue received
by the Legion from the property was used entirely for charitable
purposes.
CLASSIFICATION
There is no doubt but that the legislature has authority to
classify property for purposes of taxation. We no longer have the
familiar unqualified uniformity and equality clause, which ap-
peared in earlier Louisiana constitutions. 24 Instead our organic
law simply requires that all taxes shall be uniform upon the same
class of subjects throughout the territorial limits of the authority
levying the tax.25 It provides further that the classification for
state taxation shall be that for local taxation.2
Experience under these provisions is, however, quite limited.
In other states classification has been used rather extensively.27 It
is obvious that so long as intangibles are taxed on the same foot-
ing as real property very little of such values will be reflected on
19. Opinions of the Attorney General (1920-1922) 814 and 820; Opinions of
the Attorney General (1932-1934) 888 and 889.
20. Opinions of the Attorney General (1918-1920) 662.
21. Opinions of the Attorney General (1932-1934) 884.
22. Opinions of the Attorney General (1920-1922) 807.
23. Opinions of the Attorney General (1924-1926) 519.
24. See La. Const. of 1913, Art. 225, and the corresponding articles of pre-
ceding constitutions.
25. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 1.
26. Ibid.
27. See generally Jensen, Property Taxation in the United States (1931)
173-203, and Leland, The Classified Property Tax (1928) passim.
[Vol. IV
1942] LOUISIANA GENERAL PROPERTY TAX
the tax rolls. Thus, property of this type has by a number of our
sister states been placed in a relatively highly favored class.y
8
It seems appropriate to pose at this point a question for those
who eventually carry out a thorough study of our tax system. The
principle of classification relates the tax burden of a particular
class of Property to its special characteristics, which bear on its
responsibility to contribute to the public treasury, but at the same
time adheres to the general principle that all property which re-
ceives the protection of government should share in the cost
of that public service. Why ignore this principle, as we have been
doing for the most part, and resort instead to complete exemption
where we wish to accord favored treatment?
It is obvious that the property tax burden can be modified by
acting either on the tax base or on the tax rate. Thus, as a prac-
tical matter, property may be classified for tax purposes either in
terms of the tax base or of rates. Classification of the former sort
would involve listing various classes of property at varying per-
centages of full value. Classification by rate, of course, would in-
volve variations in rate according to the adopted classification of
property. We would suppose that the constitutional authority for
classification is broad enough to permit either type of classifica-
tion as to all property other than real estate.29 It is difficult to see
28. E.g., Ind. Acts 1933, c. 81, § 3 [Burns Ind. Stats. (1933) § 64-903]; Kan.
Laws 1931, c. 311, § 2, and c. 312, § 2 [Kan. Gen. Stats. Ann. (1935) § 79-3109];
Ky. Acts 1924, c. 116, § 1 and 1926, c. 164, § 1 [Carroll's Ky. Stats. (Baldwin's
Revision 1930) § 4019]; Mont. Laws 1919, c. 51, § 1, and 1921, c. 248, § 1 [Ander-
son and McFarland's Rev. Codes (1935) §§ 1999-2000]; N. C. Laws 1939, c. 158,
§§ 700-719 [N.C. Code Ann. (Michie 1939) §§ 7880 (156)oo-7880 (156)hhh] (This
is a state tax; intangibles are not subject to local taxation). The constitution-
ality of the Kentucky statute was upheld by the United States Supreme Court
in Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 60 S.Ct. 406, 84 L.Ed. 590 (1940), against
the charge that its rates of fifty cents per hundred dollars of assessed valua-
tion on deposits of residents in out-of-state banks and ten cents per hundred
dollars on Kentucky deposits ran afoul the due process, equal protection and
privileges and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
29. A tax system in which all taxable property was distributed into seven
separate classes and classified in terms of the tax base at different per-
centages of the full value of the property was held constitutional in the state
of Montana as not In violation of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution or of the uniformity clause
of the state constitution which, like the present Louisiana clause, required
that taxes should be "uniform on the same class of subjects within the terri-
torial limits of the authority levying the tax." Hilger v. Moore, 56 Mont. 146,
176, 182 Pac. 477, 484 (1919). In sustaining the validity of this classification
the Montana Supreme Court, without particular mention of the fact that the
classification was made by reference to the tax base, said:
"... it is sufficient to say that the difference in the nature and character
of the property, its productivity or want of it, its utility, the difficulty of
reaching some of It under the old system, the fact that the enforcement of
our former tax laws operated as a practical confiscation of the entire income
from some species of property, as illustrated in the case of Cruse v. Fischl,
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how classification of real estate, however, in terms of assessment
values, could be sustained since Section 12 of Article X of the
Constitution requires that all real estate shall be valued at actual
cash value. The court has confused the picture even as to person-
alty. In First National Bank v. Louisiana Tax Commission,0 the
basic problem was whether or not the Louisiana system of taxa-
tion of banks operated to discriminate against national banks in
favor of competing money capital and thus did not consist with
Congressional consent to the taxation of national banks as Fed-
eral instrumentalities. One ground upon which it was sought to
make out discrimination was Act 163 of 1924, which separately
classified "bonds of any State of the United States and political
subdivisions of any such State, bonds of railways, railroads and
other public utilities, manufacturing and industrial corporations
and bonds secured by real estate, except such as are exempt from
taxation by law" and ordained that such property be assessed at
ten per centum of the market value thereof. The court brushed
aside this contention with the single remark that "The statute is
so palpably violative of the constitutional requirement that all
property that is subject to taxation shall be assessed at its actual
cash value, that it has never been enforced."31 The trouble with
this conclusion which, incidentally, has been uncritically quoted
in a recent case,32 is that there is no constitutional requirement
that personal property be assessed at its actual cash value. It is
true that the Constitution provides that "no property shall be as-
sessed for more than its actual cash value,13 3 but this is a mere
ceiling and not a mandate that property shall be assessed at its
actual cash value.34 With this point conceded, however, we still
would not have a happy situation as to classification in terms of
assessment since it would not be available as to real estate and to
that material extent the device would be ineffectual.
Despite the First National Bank case and Section 12 of Article
X of the Constitution the legislature has enacted a number of
statutes classifying both real and personal property in terms of
55 Mont. 258, 175 Pac. 878-these and other reasons equally cogent must have
influenced the Legislature in making the classification indicated above."
30. 175 La. 119, 143 So. 23 (1932).
31. See First National Bank v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 175 La. 119,
139-140, 143 So. 23, 29 (1932).
32. See Hibernia National Bank in New Orleans v. Louisiana Tax Com-
mission, 195 La. 43, 59-60, 196 So. 15, 20 (1940).
33. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 1.
34. See Soniat v. Board of State Affairs, 146 La. 450, 461-462, 83 So. 760,
764 (1920).
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assessment.3 5 The most commonly employed percentage of actual
value is ten per centum. It is significant, however, that in the
cases of plants manufacturing naval stores from waste materials
such as pine stumps and resinous dead pine wood and of plants
making cellulose products from the waste materials of rice, cotton,
sugar cane or grass, the legislature, in 1940, increased the percent-
age from ten to twenty-five. 3 Doubtless the purpose of this change
was to insulate the statute against attack on the ground that the
classification was merely an ill-disguised exemption. The Attor-
ney General had previously ruled that such statutes employing a
percentage of ten were unconstitutional as left-handed exemp-
tions. 7 Undoubtedly the Attorney General was applying a per-
fectly valid idea; there is some point as to any class of property
where legitimate classification leaves off and exemption begins.
The matter will vary with the nature of the property. We are not
persuaded that classification of intangibles on the basis which im-
poses upon them only one-tenth of the burden borne by produc-
tive real property exceeds the bounds of legitimate classification.
The same might not he said, however, with respect to different
classes of real property.
We know of no constitutional obstacle in the path of classi-
fication in terms of rates. We have in Louisiana, however, a way
of flexing our property taxes from year to year which is not com-
mon in other states. Instead of taking the full assessment as the
tax base each year and varying the rate of levy according to fiscal
needs it is a common practice in Louisiana to make the adjust-
ment in the tax base. Under the scheme which obtains with re-
spect to the state property tax the levy is a continuous one made
in advance by statute and it is the duty of the Louisiana Tax
Commission to fix as the tax base in each tax year such a percent-
age of the total assessment as will, by application of the statutory
rates, be expected to yield revenues which, together with antici-
pated revenues from other sources, cover legislative appropria-
tions. 8 In these times the state property tax produces only about
35. La. Act 66 of 1924, as amended by La. Act 37 of 1932 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 8376]; La. Act 142 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8377]; La. Act 150
of 1926, as amended by La. Act 127 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1939) H§ 8374-83751;
La. Act 47 of 1930 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8373] La. Act 208 of 1936 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 8380.1-8380.2]; La. Act 274 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §
8380.3]; La. Act 266 of 1940, § 24 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 1305.24].
36. La. Acts 66 of 1924 and 150 of 1926, both as amended, were superseded
by La. Act 198 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 8376.1] which changed the
percentage of valuation from ten per centum to twenty-five per centum.
37. Opinions of the Attorney General (1932-1934) 931.
38. La. Act 140 of 1916, § 10, paragraph 13, as reenacted by La. Act 211
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one-tenth of the total state revenue. This situation has induced
the Louisiana Tax Commission, we are informed, to regard the
statutory provision as obsolete and that body, accordingly, makes
no attempt to apply it. The net effect is that the full state levy is
imposed each year upon the full assessed value of the taxable
property in the state.
The way is paved for a local taxing unit to use a percentage
of the state assessment as the local tax base by Section 1 of Ar-
ticle X of the Constitution. While the local taxing unit is bound
by the State valuation and classification its tax authorities are au-
thorized to adopt a "different percentage of such valuation for
purposes of local taxation."8 9
It may be that this system of flexing the tax base has been
deemed an impediment to effectual classification by rates. It is
not evident, however, why the system should be so regarded. The
application of the classified rates and the computation of the tax
would not be further complicated by this factor because the only
difference would be that instead of applying the rates to one hun-
dred per centum of assessed value of all taxable property they
would be applied to some other percentage employed uniformly
as to all classes of property.
The constitution requires uniformity of taxation upon the
''same class of subjects." The question arises whether permissible
classification is confined to the creation of classes based on differ-
ences in types of properties to the exclusion of classification made
by reference to the character of the owner. As a matter of fact
our legislature has on occasion undertaken classification in terms
of assessment by reference to the character of the ownership of
property rather than the characteristics of the property itself."
No help is to be derived on this problem from the Louisiana cases
but such classification has been left in doubt in other states.41
ASSESSMENT
The legal embroglio which we confront here is astounding.
of 1918, § 1; La. Act 161 of 1938, § 1; and La. Act 236 of 1940, § 1 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 8321 (13)].
39. See Parker v. Cave, 198 La. 267, 3 So. (2d) 617 (1941), discussed in The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1940-1941 Term (1942) 4
LOUISIANA LAW REvmw 165, 224.
40. La. Act 274 of 1936, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8380.3] and La. Act 266
of 1940, § 24 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 1305.24].
41. See Gillen v. Essex County Board of Taxation, 91 N.J. L. 76, 102 Atl.
676 (1917); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Sanders County, 66 Mont. 608, 214 Pac.
596 (1923); State ex rel. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Duncan, 68 Mont. 420, 219
Pac. 638 (1923).
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The laws governing assessment are in such a state that the Louis-
iana Tax Commission, the highest administrative authority in this
field of administration, does not profess to be able to identify all
the laws relating to the subject. It has recently issued a booklet
under the revealing title "Principal Assessment Laws of the State
of Louisiana."
In its foreword the Commission had this to say:
"The Louisiana Tax Commission, in compiling these con-
stitutional and statutory provisions of the law of Louisiana
governing assessment for ad valorem tax purposes in this
State, has endeavored to include the principal laws relating to
this subject matter, but does not represent that all laws per-
taining to property tax assessment have been included."
There is little wonder that the Commission has suggested
that codification and revision of the laws governing assessment is
needed.
One of the more troublesome aspects of the present situation
is that although we shifted, by the Constitution of 1921, from a
system of separate assessments for state and local purposes to a
plan under which the valuation for state purposes serves as the
valuation for local purposes, the governing statutes have not been
fully adjusted to the change. In the matter of review of assess-
ments, for example, the old statute designed to make the decis-
ions of the parish boards of reviewers final, short of judicial re-
view, with respect to assessment for purposes of local taxation,"
has not been changed although obviously under the present
scheme the state assessment governs for local purposes and the
Louisiana Tax Commission makes the final administrative deter-
mination of assessed values for state purposes.3
Although the state valuation is the only valuation, the Tax
Commission statute, as amended through 1940, still makes it the
duty of the Commission to confer with the parish assessors about
valuation for other than state purposes. 4'
This statute still, in terms, leaves "to the lawful authorities
of each parish or other subdivision levying, assessing and collect-
ing taxes, full liberty to assess taxes on, and fix valuations at, less
than actual cash valuation as they deem fit; provided, that the
42. La. Act 170 of 1898, § 24, as amended by La. Acts 130 of 1902, § 2, and
63 of 1906 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 83961.
43. La. Act 140 of 1916, § 10, as amended by La. Acts 211 of 1918, § 1, 161
of 1938, § 1, and 236 of 1940, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8321].
44. Id. at paragraph 5.
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percentage of the actual cash valuation of the property assessed
in any parish, for other than State purposes, shall not fall below
twenty-five per cent of the actual cash valuation, as fixed by the
Board (Louisiana Tax Commission) for State purposes; . .. " This
is loose language in relation to the present system. Section 1 of
Article X of the Constitution appears to use "assessment" and "val-
uation" interchangeably to denote the fixing of the value of prop-
erty upon which the rates of levy will be laid. If this be so, the
statute should clearly ordain that the state valuation governs but
that a political subdivision may take a percentage of that valua-
tion in fixing its tax base.4 5
There has not been even an adequate effort to modify the ref-
erential language of the statutes to conform to constitutional and
statutory changes. As amended by Act 236 of 1940, Section 10 of
Act 140 of 1916 still refers to Articles 225 and 226 of the Constitu-
tion as the authority for the assessment of all taxable property for
state purposes by the Louisiana Tax Commission. There are, of
course, no such articles in the present constitution and the refer-
ence is to the constitution that existed in 1916, namely, that of
1913. The same statute is still fraught with references to the old
Board of State Affairs, which was a predecessor of the Louisiana
Tax Commission, and to the old State Board of Equalization.
Section 17 of Act 170 of 1898,46 the ancient basic property tax
statute, is a veritable gem of statutory obsoleteness. It begins by
providing that the assessors of the several parishes, other than
Orleans, shall be furnished by the Auditor of Public Accounts
"with blank forms of assessments, as follows,. . ." Then follows a
list of the most diverse sorts of properties from geldings to silver
plate and from goats to jute. Included also are white and colored
children between the ages of six and eighteen years, registered
by race and sex!
This amazing section goes on to provide that the assessors
shall list and assess all property within their respective parishes
in accordance with the prescribed blank only to wind up by ad-
monishing them in a separate paragraph which does not even con-
stitute a complete sentence, as follows: "The true intent and ob-
ject of this provision being for the purpose of gathering informa-
tion and not especially for assessment for purposes of taxation."
45. Direct language of this sort is used in the pertinent special statute,
which governs in Orleans Parish. La. Act 227 of 1936, § 7 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 8346.5].
46. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8339.
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(a) Procedural Aspects
Assessment procedure in Louisiana has its complications.
With respect to the state in general, apart from New Orleans, one
may search in vain for a statutory designation of tax day, that is,
the day as of which property is to be valued for purposes of a
given tax year. The courts have, of course, filled the gap by deter-
mining that January 1 is tax day.47 There is authority that in the
case of movables, on the other hand, property brought into the
state after January 1 is to be assessed,4 and property moved from
one parish to another after January 1 is assessable in the parish to
which removed if not already assessed in the other parish. 9 Just
how such rulings could be given practical effect in administration
is a matter not at all clear to us. Obviously, the various steps in-
volved in the total process of imposing and collecting property
taxes must be taken in an orderly sequence and it is not at all evi-
dent how the assessor can be expected to reflect upon the tax rolls
personal property brought into his parish at any time during the
tax year. A practical disposition of the matter has been largely
made, as we have already seen, by constitutional and administra-
tive exemption of most types of personalty.
In order to get taxpayers to list their taxable property the
statute requires them to file their individual lists or returns not
later than April 1st of the tax year.'0 The only sanction to sup-
port this requirement, however, is the so-called "doom of the as-
sessor," which means that if the taxpayer fails to comply he will
be bound by the determination of the assessor. The supreme court
has made it clear that the taxpayer will be bound only on the
question of valuation and not as to any matter of law affecting
the validity of the assessment.5 1 The statute, if we are correctly
informed, is not effective. In Caddo Parish, for example, a parish
blessed with an able assessor, less than a third of the property
taxpayers file returns.
In the case of merchandise January 1 of the tax year does not
47. Southern Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 49 La. Ann. 401, 21 So. 913
(1897); Gulf Public Service Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 167 La. 757, 120
So. 286 (1929); New Orleans Bank and Trust Co. v. City of New Orleans, 176
La. 946, 147 So. 42 (1933).
48. Griggsby Construction Co. v. Freeman, 108 La. 435, 32 So. 399 (1902).
49. Hammond Lumber Co. v. Smart, 129 La. 945, 57 So. 277 (1912). It
should be observed that at that time the constitution required that all prop-
erty be taxed in proportion to its value. La. Const. of 1898, Art. 226. There is
no such mandate in the present constitution.
50. La. Act 182 of 1906, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8335).
51. Louisiana Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. vines, 150 La. 311, 90 So. 660
(1922).
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govern. On the contrary, the assessment is based on inventories
taken during the calendar year preceding tax day. The form of
list or return prescribed for use by the taxpayer calls for totals of
inventories on January 1, July 1 and December 31 of the preced-
ing calendar year. The Tax Commission has advised the assessors
that the taxpayer should furnish as many inventories as possible
and that he, the assessor, should not accept less than two.5 2 The
assessment is based on an average of such inventories, subject
to a deduction for obsolescence. Such statutory basis as there is
for this practice is to be found in Section 7 of Act 170 of 1898, as
amended.5 3 In that section is to be found the following remarkable
passage:
".. . in the assessment of merchandise, or, stock in trade on
hand during the year preceding the calendar year in which the
assessment is made, the inventory value of such merchandise,
etc., shall be arrived at by computing the cost or purchase-
price of said shipment at the point of origin, plus the carrying
charges to the point of destination, and the average value ar-
rived at as above required shall be the basis for fixing the
assessable value. .
This linguistic monstrosity defies intelligent application. The way
the tax authorities have attempted to apply it has just been out-
lined.
There is an old statute, which goes back to 1894, 54 which au-
thorizes the sheriffs throughout the state, except in the case of
the Parish of Orleans, to list for taxation all merchandise or stock
in trade brought into the several parishes for sale after comple-
tion of the assessment rolls for the tax year. It is expressly in-
applicable to merchants or other parties "who have been regu-
larly assessed." Under present conditions, moreover, its signifi-
cance is at a minimum because it applies only to merchandise or
stock in trade brought into a parish for sale after the assessment
rolls for the year are completed; the assessment rolls are not fin-
ally completed under present practice until late in the year and,
in some instances, not until after the end of the year.
The form of list or return which is prescribed for the use of
the taxpayer calls for the listing of credits on a similar basis as
merchandise. It contemplates a similar averaging of the credits
as of different dates during the preceding calendar year subject
52. Assessment Suggestions to the Assessors and Police Juries (1942) 20.
53. See La. Act 78 of 1932, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8328].
54. La. Act 33 of 1894, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8354].
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to deductions for bills and accounts payable. The Tax Commis-
sion's "Assessment Suggestions to the Assessors and Police Jur-
ies" states that, in the case of credits of loan and finance com-
panies, the assessor should determine from the taxpayer's books
the average loans for the year, excluding loans secured by mort-
gages on property in Louisiana." This suggestion is not supported
by any citation to statute. We have been unable to find any clear
statutory basis for the use of such an averaging scheme in the
case of credits. It is true that Act 24 of the Extraordinary Session
of 1918 does permit the deduction of bills and accounts payable
but, as to the manner of assessment in other respects, it simply
provides that credits shall be assessed in the same way as all
other personal property. Certainly, personal property in general
is not assessed on the basis of the average holdings during the
preceding calendar year. The fact that the suggestion of the Tax
Commission referred simply to loan and finance companies merely
punctuates the proposition that the credits of other classes of tax-
payers simply are not listed. While the constitutionality of the de-
duction of bills and accounts payable had been upheld in earlier
cases,56 the supreme court, in support of a 1940 decision invali-
dating as a statutory exemption a statute excluding an important
element of value in the assessment of bank shares, 5 quoted ap-
provingly from the opinion in a South Dakota case,58 in which
such a deduction was declared unconstitutional because not on
the exclusive constitutional list of exemptions. The court, thus,
unwittingly, no doubt, cast a cloud over the Louisiana deduction.
By Section 16 of Act 170 of 1898 the parish assessor is re-
quired, either personally or by deputy, to visit individuals, firms
and corporations to obtain sworn lists of their taxable property.5 9
Act 38 of 1884,10 which presumably has not been repealed, ren-
ders an assessor liable to a penalty in the event that he has failed
to visit any piece of taxable property within his jurisdiction, di-
rectly or by deputy, and it shall thereby escape assessment. In
parishes where there are adequate assessment maps there is little
doubt but that these provisions have no further practical meaning
as sanctions to secure the listing of taxable real property. But it is
55. Pp. 23-24.
56. New Orleans Securities Co. v. City of New Orleans, 173 La. 1097, 139
So. 635 (1932).
57. Hibernia National Bank v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 195 La. 43, 196
So. 15 (1940).
58. In re Construction of Revenue Law, 2 S.D. 58, 48 N.W. 813 (1891).
59. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8337.
60. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8350-8351.
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not every parish which has such a map or maps and, of course,
improvements may be erected from time to time. The surmise
that there is considerable real as well as personal property, which
is legally subject to taxation but is not listed on the assessment
rolls, is hardly a wild guess. It is not to be supposed, on the other
hand, that any attempt is made to enforce this provision. Visita-
tion by assessors is not the order of the day.
The valuations made by the parish assessors are submitted to
the Louisiana Tax Commission for final administrative determi-
nation of assessments. The Commission may require, for this
purpose, that an assessor deliver to it one of the three copies of
his assessment roll which is required by law, or an abstract
thereof, as the Commission shall see fit. The Commission would
hardly be expected to change many valuations made by the as-
sessors on this basis; the work of the assessors doubtless remains
largely determinative as a practical matter in the process of as-
sessment. Of significance in this connection, however, is the fact
that the legislature, by Act 18 of the Second Extraordinary Ses-
sion of 1934,61 authorized the Commission to change and correct
any and all assessments at any time before the "taxes assessed"
shall have actually been paid. Under this scheme the Commission
is empowered to make such a correction or change simply by issu-
ing written instructions to the assessor to modify the assessment
roll or, in the event that the assessment roll has been delivered to
the tax collector, to direct him to make the modification and to
collect taxes accordingly. The taxpayer must be furnished with a
copy of such instructions by registered mail and he is allowed
thirty days following the date of the instructions within which to
institute suit to challenge the Commission's action. The political
character of this enactment is patent. It is obviously open to sub-
stantial abuse; the Commission may act summarily without being
subject to any of the common safeguards upon administrative
action such as a hearing. The opportunity to challenge the action
of the Commission may save the act on the score of constitution-
ality but it does not necessarily help the taxpayer who has to
61. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8324.1 et seq.
It has been contended that under the present tax statutes the power to
assess is vested exclusively in the Louisiana Tax Commission but the only
decision on the point squarely rejects that interpretation. G. R. McKinney
Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 150 So. 452 (La. App. 1933). In a very
effective opinion the court made it clear that the local tax authorities are
very much a part of the assessment picture even though the work of the
parish assessors and boards of reviewers is only tentative.
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choose between the expenses of a law suit and a boost in his
taxes.
(b) Substantive Aspects
While, as has been indicated in the discussion of classification,
it is only real estate, which, as a constitutional matter, must be
assessed at actual cash value, the Legislature has not attempted
to give effect to any such distinction. On the contrary, real prop-
erty and personal property generally are subject to the same stat-
utory rule as to valuation. Prior to 1934 the statute required val-
uation at actual cash value and defined that phrase to mean a
price that any piece of property would "sell for, for cash in the
ordinary course of business, free of all encumbrances, otherwise
than by forced sale. '62 This definition goes all the way back to
the 1880's.os The court always accepted it as a proper interpreta-
tion of the words "actual cash value" as used in the Constitution.
We would not undertake to say just what the meaning of the
phrase is, as used in the constitution, but its reference to cash
value certainly suggests a conception of market value because
it measures value in terms of the medium of exchange. Such a
notion is altogether artificial in times of financial stringency.
Thus, it is not surprising that the Legislature of 1934 so amended
the statutory definition of "actual cash value" as to permit the
assessors to consider "every element of value."" In times of
depression, when there is no market for most real property, it
is obvious that there would be no hope of applying the old
definition.
Even in better times, the market value conception is not
applied. While it would be difficult to generalize because assess-
ment practices vary, buildings on urban real property, for example,
are valued separately from the land on some such basis as original
cost plus cost of improvements less depreciation rather than on
the unitary basis of an individual determination as to what each
parcel would bring at a voluntary sale. As a matter of practical
administration it is too much to expect that the assessors would
perform each year the tremendous task that the application of
this latter method would involve. In fat years, moreover, valua-
tions might run relatively high in contrast with the hopelessly
62. La. Act 170 of 1898, § 91, paragraph 6, as amended by La. Act 130 of
1902, § 5.
63. La. Act 98 of 1886, § 93.
64. La. Act 126 of 1934, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 82001. If "actual cash
value" is a "willing-seller, willing-buyer" notion of market value, this statute,
liberally Interpreted, might be hard to square with the constitution.
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meager tax base in lean years. Such fluctuations have not been
permitted in fact because of the obvious need for stability of
public revenue.,' The constitutional limitations on the parish and
municipal general alimony taxes preclude resort to increased
levies to solve the problem.66
The "actual cash value" criterion would be the source of
further difficulties if the court were to give constitutional status
to its theory of "unitary" assessment. The court has taken the
position that the statute law requires that parcels of real property
be valued as a unit, which would render it improper to determine
total value by first valuing land and timber or a city lot and im-
provements separately. 7 In so ruling as to improved urban realty
the court did not refer to a statute of 1916,68 which as amended
in 1918,69 expressly requires separate assessment of improvements.
Doubtless this was an oversight of counsel. The point we wish
to make is that, on the merits, it could with some force be argued
that actual cash value is a conception of market value and that
it would do violence to that conception to break up into several
parts for assessment purposes that which is a market unit.7 0 At
all events, the Louisiana Tax Commission has instructed the as-
sessors to follow the statutory requirement of separate assessment
65. The point has been neatly put by Professor Bonbright: "During a
depression, therefore, assessors and judges must conspire in a gigantic legal
lie about property values-a lie which is concealed by all sorts of loose talk
about the stability of real values as contrasted with the collapse of mere
market prices. In short, then, as long as the law gives to taxpayers the nomi-
nal right to insist on assessments which do not exceed the 'fair market value'
or the 'actual value' of their real property, this law must be violated in fact
through quibbling interpretations of the meaning of value or through the
Imposition on the taxpayers of burdens of proof that are deliberately made
impossible to sustain." I Bonbright, Valuation of Property (1937) 471.
66. The normal limit as to parishes is four mills on the dollar of assessed
valuation and that as to municipalities is seven mills. La. Const. of 1921, Art.
XIV, §§ 11 and 12. As tax limitations go, these are pretty drastic.
67. Delta Land and Timber Co. v. Police Jury, 169 La. 537, 125 So. 585
(1929) (timber land); Whited v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 178 La. 877, 152
So. 552 (1934) (improved urban realty).
68. La. Act 140 of 1916, § 10, paragraph 3.
69. La. Act 211 of 1918, § 1.
70. "Although a separate valuation of land and of improvements is called
for by many of the statutes as well as by the practice of assessors, the ficti-
tious nature of this separation is apparent. One simply cannot find the value,
say, of the Stevens Hotel property in Chicago or of Mr. Schwab's residence
in New York by adding the value of the ground devoid of the building, to
the value of the building devoid of the ground. The attempt to do so would
result in the same error that would be committed were we to seek the value
of Raphael's Sistine Madonna by adding the separate value of the lower half
of the canvas to the separate value of the upper half." I Bonbright, Valuation
of Property (1937) 485.
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as to urban property,' and to assess timber separately from the
land.7 2
The transparently artificial quality of the "actual cash value"
criterion need not be labored. That in the hands of those deter-
mining assessments and even of the courts it regularly gives way
to individual more or less intuitive value judgments is evident.
One is likely to be told, moreover, that common sense and prac-
tical experience are what it takes to make an assessor and that
scientific techniques in valuation are the "bunk. 7 3 The vagaries
of assessment must, under such a system, be great.
Our assessors do not even have the benefit of a manual of
assessment based on a study of Louisiana values and on the best
valuation thought of the country as a whole. The Commission's
annual "Assessment Suggestions to the Assessors and Police Ju-
ries" doubtless affords the assessors some guidance but it is far
from a manual. What enlightment, for example, does it give an
assessor to tell him that lands with growing pecan groves shall
be assessed according to their "intrinsic worth," all lands pro-
ducing salt shall be valued at their "actual worth" and miscel-
laneous lands at "actual values"?74
Soniat v. Board of State Affairs,' 5 is instructive. Under the old
dual system of assessment the actual cash value of a taxpayer's
property had, for state purposes, been fixed at $277,480 and, for
local purposes, at $428,210. After the period provided by statute
for bringing an action to correct an assessment (a remedy avail-
able to one who had filed a return and thus avoided the doom of
the assessor) had expired the taxpayer brought suit to nullify the
assessments. He contended that two actual cash values had been
fixed whereas the constitution contemplated only one and that,
71. Assessment Suggestions to the Assessors and Police Juries (1942) 16-17.
72. Id. at 12.
73. In rejecting assessment of city realty based on appraisals in which
the front-foot unit was employed the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
Harleigh Realty Company's Case, 299 Pa. 385, 390, 149 At. 653, 655 (1930), had
this to say: "The argument of appellant which we have outlined apparently
proceeds upon the assumption that tax assessments are a matter of formula,
but they are not-they are a matter of judgment in each individual case.
'Common sense and practical everyday business experience are the best
guides for those intrusted with the administration of tax laws': P. & R. C. & I.
Co. v. Northumberland Co. Comrs., 229 Pa. 460, 471."
Front-foot valuation of urban land is, of course, a commonplace under the
familiar standardized method of valuation, variations of which are, we under-
stand, employed in Louisiana.
74. These phrases appear on pages 12 and 13 of the 1941 edition of the
pamphlet.
75. 146 La. 450, 83 So. 760 (1920).
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in any event, the local valuation, so far as it exceeded that for
state purposes, was void. Chief Justice Monroe answered him
as follows:
... 'Actual cash value' (as that term is used in the statute)
is the price which the law (Act 130 of 1902, § 5, subd. 6, p. 226),
arbitrarily and for the purposes of taxation, assumes that
property will bring if sold for cash under certain conditions.
'Valuation,' upon the other hand, is merely the estimate in
dollars and cents which, for the same purposes, the assessors
(state board and local authorities) are required to make of
the 'actual cash value' or 'just and true value' of all taxable
property within their respective jurisdictions. It is clear, then,
that neither the value of property (whether 'actual cash' or
'just and true') nor yet its 'valuation' is a determined factor,
like the length of a yardstick or the weight of a minted coin,
and that though property can have but one value at one and
the same time, determinable as it is by varied conditions of
time and place and the state of the money market, and which
neither the assessors nor the lawmakers can fix or change
by mere declarations, there may be, and frequently are, as
many estimates, or valuations, of that value as there are
individuals who are called on to express their opinions upon
the subject."7"
The suit was dismissed.
Since a taxpayer has a constitutional right to judicial review
of his assessment," persons with large holdings justifying ex-
pensive litigation have extra strings to their bows. The review
afforded is direct review; the court sitting in a statutory action to
correct an assessment does not merely lay down the law to the
administrative authorities and tell them to reassess accordingly
but proceeds to make the valuation itself.7 s The court's value
judgment is not necessarily any better than the administrator's
but it has the last word.
REVIEw
Administrative review of individual assessments is a widely
76. 146 La. 450, 458-459, 83 So. 760, 763 (1920).
77. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 1.
78. See La. Act 97 of 1924 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8360 et seq.]. Cases in
which the courts have directly changed valuations by their judgments are
common. For example see Baton Rouge Electric Co. v. Board of State Affairs,
149 La. 383, 89 So. 244 (1921); Baton Rouge Waterworks Co. v. Board of State
Affairs, 149 La. 391, 89 So. 247 (1921).
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recognized safeguard designed to afford the individual property
owner protection against over-assessment. This step in the prop-
erty tax process has long been a part of Louisiana property tax
procedure. The statutory provisions on the subject are, however,
in a sad state. Most of the trouble stems from the fact, as pre-
viously intimated, that despite the provisions of the Constitution
of 1921 which established a single assessment under which the
state assessment governs for all purposes in lieu of the old system
of separate assessments for state and local purposes, the statutes
still deal with review in terms of the dual system.
Prior to the Constitution of 1921 the police jurors of a parish
constituted a board of reviewers to perform the reviewing func-
tion for their parish.79 A taxpayer who complained of an assess-
ment was entitled to review by the board. 0 Its determinations
were final, short of judicial review, for purposes of local taxation.
Now, it is obvious that the reviewing function should be per-
formed after the primary function of assessment has been com-
pleted. But since 'the parish assessor no longer does the ultimate
assessing for local purposes violence would be done to logical
sequence if the boards of reviewers sat prior to final assessment
by the Louisiana Tax Commission. The situation involves a fur-
ther difficulty arising out of the fact that the law contemplates
that the police juries serve as boards of reviewers with respect
to assessment for state purposes of all property not assessable by
the state authorities prior to the adoption of Act 140 of 1916."'
With respect to these assessments the conclusions of a board of
reviewers were and remain merely recommendatory. The diffi-
culty that such review now presents is that if the local boards are
to review assessments before the rolls are submitted to the Tax
Commission double review will be entailed since there would
have to be a second review after the Tax Commission had fixed
the valuations for state purposes. The Tax Commission, how-
ever, has authority to determine when the local boards shall sit.2
Thus, the simple solution to the problem is for the Commission
to fix a time which shall come after the Commission has per-
79. La. Act 170 of 1898, § 23, as amended by La. Act 135 of 1940, § 1 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 8395].
80. La. Act 170 of 1898, § 24, as amended by La. Acts 130 of 1902, § 2, and
63 of 1906, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8396].
81. La. Act 140 of 1916, § 15, as amended by La. Act 211 of 1918, § 4 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 8417].82. La. Act 140 of 1916, § 10, paragraph 11, as amended by La. Acts 211 of
1918, § 1, 161 of 1938, § 1, and 236 of 1940, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 83211.
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formed its assessing function. And this, we understand, is exactly
what the Commission has done.
The process of review received a serious statutory blow in
1924. In that year the legislature enacted that:
". any taxpayer in this State, the Parish of Orleans excepted,
who has filed a sworn list or return of his property for taxation
on or before April 1st of any year shall have the right to
institute suit in the court having jurisdiction of the cause of
action, for the purpose of contesting the correctness or legality
of any assessment made against the property listed on the
said return...
"... No other condition precedent than those specified herein
shall be required of the taxpayer in order to permit him to
exercise the right of action hereby granted."8
This enactment renders it unnecessary that the complaining tax-
payer first exhaust his administrative remedies before resorting
to the courts." He may ignore the board of reviewers. Does this
not devitalize administrative review? Would it not be much
sounder policy to condition judicial review upon previous ex-
haustion of administrative remedies? The system of administra-
tive redress should not, of course, be calculated to block ultimate
access to the courts. But the constitutional right to judicial re-
view of assessments is not so absolute as to preclude reasonable
conditions precedent of an administrative character. 5
It is evident that, at the very minimum, the statutory pro-
visions governing the process of review of assessments should be
brought up to date and fully adjusted to the constitutional fact
that the state assessment governs for all purposes.
EQUALIZATION
Parish boards of equalization performed the equalization
function for local purposes for two decades beginning in 1920.80
The legislature abolished those boards in 1940.87 Today, there is
no provision for systematic intra-parish equalization. Undoubted-
ly, a rough measure of equalization is achieved by the assessors
83. La. Act 97 of 1924, §§ 1 and 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8360 and 8362].
84. Bowman-Hicks Lumber Co. v. Reid, 169 La. 905, 126 So. 232 (1930).
85. Marston v. Elliott, 138 La. 574, 70 So. 519 (1916), is squarely in point.
At that time resort to the board of reviewers was a statutory condition prece-
dent to suit and the court upheld the scheme.
86. La. Act 231 of 1920, as amended by La. Acts 228 of 1936 and 144 of
1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8381 et seq.]
87. La. Act 134 of 1940.
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themselves in the performance of the primary function of assess-
ment. But, the police jurors sitting as boards of reviewers have
no power with respect to equalization. Under Section 24 of Act
170 of 1898,8 it was their duty to go over the rolls in detail on
a comparative basis with a view to determining whether the
valuations were "equitable and just and in accord with the re-
quirements of the Constitution." The supreme court has declared
that the provisions of Section 15 of Act 140 of 1916, which relate
to the powers and functions of boards of reviewers operate to
exclude this general review of the lists and to confine the boards
to consideration of individual assessments only upon complaints
of taxpayers. 89
With respect to equalization as between the several parishes
the most significant observation we can offer is that, whatever
the statutes may say on the subject, there has in fact been no such
equalization in many years. This condition is bound to involve
substantial inequality. It requires little acumen to perceive that
the assessors and police jurors of the several parishes are not go-
ing to maintain the same ratios of. assessed to full value. The net
effect, of course, is to impose upon taxpayers in some parishes rel-
atively higher state property tax burdens than are sustained by
taxpayers in other parishes. As a matter of law and of tax policy
and equity this condition is entirely unjustifiable.
We do not profess to know just what considerations have
moved the Louisiana Tax Commission to ignore its statutory
duties in this respect. We would sympathize with them in any
effort to give reasonably close application to the statutes on the
subject for they certainly are confusing. We refer particularly
to the provisions with respect to equalization of the assessments
of personal property, which are quoted below.90 Considerable
88. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8396.
89. Bowman-Hicks Lumber Co. v. Reid, 169 La. 905, 126 So. 232 (1930).
90. Sections 8 and 9 of La. Act 182 of 1906 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8411
and 8412] read as follows:
"Section 8. Said board in equalizing the valuation of property as listed
and assessed in different parishes, shall consider the following classes of
property separately, to wit: Personal property, lands, and town and city lots
and shall further subdivide these classes as they may deem necessary and
upon such consideration, determine such rates of addition to, or deduction
from the listed or assessed valuation of each of said classes of property in
each parish, as may be deemed by the board to be equitable and just, such
rates to be in all cases even and not fractional.
"Section 9. In equalizing the value of liersonal property between the
several parishes, said board shall cause to be obtained the state averages of
the several kinds of enumerated property, from the aggregate footings of
the number and value of each; and the value of enumerated property thus
obtained, as compared with the assessed value of said property in each par-
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speculation has not enabled us to formulate a sensible interpre-
tation of these provisions.
The section governing equalization of lands is more under-
standable.' As a matter of fact, because of the dominant r6le
played by real property in the general property. tax picture it is
here that the equalization factor is most important. The unhappy
fact remains that such equalization is not even attempted.
It may be that the problem of equalization as between the
parishes is to a certain extent obviated in advance by the printed
suggestions which the Louisiana Tax Commission each year is-
sues to the local assessors. As to a good many types of property
these suggestions are quite specific in laying down unit values.
To the extent that the suggestions or instructions are this explicit
the process is simply a mathematical one as far as the assessors
are concerned. In the matter of oil storage tanks, filling station
equipment, oil and gas wells and pipe lines, for example, the
specific unit values are laid down by the Commission. It is to be
borne in mind, however, that this practice, apart from any ques-
tion as to its acceptability as a method of determining taxable
values, leaves untouched the problem of equalization with respect
to the more valuable classes of land and improvements upon land.
LEVY
This step in the property tax process does not call for much
separate comment in this discussion. This, however, is not to
say that reexamination on the level of policy in not highly in
order. Many policy questions merit consideration. Should not the
state, for example, give over the general property tax entirely
to local government? Are the tax limitations applicable to local
government too stringent? 2 Conversely, are not the constitu-
tional debt limitations to which local government is subject too
lax, with the effect of permitting too free resort to unlimited
debt-service taxation?93
ish, shall be taken by said board to obtain a rate per cent to be added to or
deducted from the total value of personal property in each parish; provided,
that whenever In the opinion' of the board it is necessary to a more just and
equitable equalization of personal property, that a rate per cent be added to
or deducted from the value thus obtained in any one or more of the parishes,
said board shall have the right to do so; but the rate per cent hereinafter
required shall first be obtained to form the basis upon which the equalization
of personal property shall be made."
91. La. Act 182 of 1906, § 10 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8413].
92. See note 66, supra.
93. A local borrowing unit may not issue bonds for any one purpose of
Issue, which, In the aggregate, exceed ten per centum of assessed taxable
values within the unit. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIV, § 14(f). Since there are
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As the reader will already have observed, the legislature has
imposed a continuous levy of the state property tax by statute."
Local taxes, on the other hand, are levied from year to year by
the local authorities upon whom that power has been conferred
by law. The local levies break down into two main categories,
namely, the general alimony tax, which is imposed for the general
support of government, and debt-service levies, which are laid
to provide for principal and interest requirements of bonds issued
by the local units of government.
There is one interesting quirk which we would like to men-
tion in .passing. Louisiana has not only a rigid doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers, 5 but also a special constitutional provision for-
bidding any non-judicial function to be attached to any court of
record or the judges thereof." If there is any power of govern-
ment, moreover, which is clearly legislative it is the power to
levy taxes. Yet our courts feel free to change local tax levies
by their judgments! In Tremont Lumber Co. v. Police Jury of
Winn Parish,17 the district court, on complaint of a taxpayer, had
reduced a special levy of ten mills on the dollar for 1925 to meet
road district bond principal and interest to nine and a half mills.
If fully collected the levy would have produced $91,074.25, which
was $11,324.25 more than principal and interest maturing that
year. Some $4,000 of this difference was necessary to cover as-
sessor's and collector's commissions. It was clear that a tax of
nine mills would have been inadequate. But a nine and a half
mill rate would allow a $2,000 margin for failure to collect part
of the tax. The supreme court affirmed without making any ref-
erence to the legislative character of what it was doing. Even
apart from this basic difficulty, one would suppose that the exer-
cise of local discretion as to the amount of tax overlay to cushion
partial failure of collection should be disturbed by the courts only
in flagrant cases because the responsibility and the authority are
those of the local taxing body.98
numerous authorized purposes of issue this limitation is farcical as to a
municipality, for example.
94. La. Act 109 of 1921 (E.S.), § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8292].
95. La. Const. of 1921, Art. II.
96. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 3.
97. 164 La. 257, 113 So. 839 (1927).
It is interesting to observe that the bondholders, although their interests
were directly and substantially affected, were not represented in the case.
98. See East St. Louis and The Treasurer of East St. Louis v. United
States ex rel. Zebley, 110 U. S. 321, 4 S.Ct. 21, 28 L.Ed, 162 (1884).
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COLLECTION OF TAXES
There is no forfeiture for non-payment of property taxes in
Louisiana, nor are those taxes normally enforced by suit 9 In-
stead the collector's chief sanction is sale. In the case of immov-
ables the only property subject to sale is the specific property
on which the delinquent taxes were laid. 10 While the Constitu-
tion is clear on this, the statute blandly continues to require the
tax collector to seize and sell any other property of the tax debtor
in order to effect collection, whenever it shall be necessary. 0 1
Taxes on movables are collected by seizure and sale of any mov-
ables of the taxpayer sufficient for the purpose but the collector
may proceed against incorporeal rights only if he can find no
movables.' 0
It has been decided that this provision and the pertinent
statute create, in effect, a privilege in favor of taxing units upon
all movable property of a delinquent taxpayer "whether assessed
or not assessed... for any taxes due by said delinquent upon any
personal property."'18 In a later case the court has cited this de-
cision as authority for the proposition that taxes on personal
property become a personal liability of the person assessed and
are "collectible out of any property belonging to the person as-
sessed.'10 4 Surely this proposition goes too far; it means that per-
sonal property taxes are collectible out of real property, for which
there is no basis whatever in the constitutional provision.105 It
seems to us unwarranted, moreover, to say that the delinquent
is personally liable for taxes on movables. If he is personally
liable he is subject to unconditional judgment for the amount of
the taxes and such judgment could, of course, be satisfied out of
his real property.
The constitution ordains that, at the expiration of the tax
99. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 11.
100. This is the effect, not the express wording, of paragraph 1 of Section
11 of Article X of the Constitution.
101. La. Act 170 of 1898, § 54 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8442.1.
102. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 11. There is no redemption of movables.
103. Cleveland Steel Co. v. Joe Kaufman Co., 155 La. 529, 532, 99 So. 428,
429 (1924).
104. Louisiana Oil Refining Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 167 La. 605,
606, 120 So. 23 (1929).
105. Whitney National Bank of New Orleans v. Socola Rice Mill Co., 182
La. 879, 162 So. 651 (1935), is significant. The court upheld the action of an
assessor in correcting an erroneous original assessment of machinery as per-
sonalty by a supplemental assessment on the premises to which it was
attached. Surely the reason the assessor was moved to do this was the fact
that only by such a correction could the tax on the machinery be made a
charge on the realty.
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year, the tax collector shall proceed, after notice to the delin-
quent, to advertise for sale and sell the immovables on which
taxes are due.106 Interest begins running with the new year."°T
The actual process of assessment, review, and so on, culminating
in a copy of the final tax roll on which the state and parish taxes
have been extended being placed in the hands of the collector,"0 8
not uncommonly falls so far behind the statutory tax calendar that
one's taxes may not even have become fixed by the end of the tax
year. At such a time we witness the anomaly of taxes being delin-
quent and interest accruing although tax liability has not been
finally determined! This is a practical administrative aspect of
the general property tax that invites searching inquiry.
The parish tax collectors bear the responsibility of collecting
the state and parish taxes. They are accountable to the state
auditor for the former. Municipal taxes are collected by the
municipalities themselves on the basis of tax rolls made up by
reference to the parish rolls.0 9 The constitutional provisions gov-
erning the collection of state taxes are expressly made applicable
to local taxes."1
In the event of tax sale of immovables for state and parish
taxes at which no bid equal to the taxes plus costs and interest
is received it is the duty of the collector to bid in the property for
the state.111 This is the familiar adjudication to the state.
The constitution provides that property sold at tax sale shall
be redeemable at any time during three years from the date of
recordation of the tax sale. 12 This provision has been interpreted
to apply only to sales to private purchasers to the exclusion of tax
adjudications."1 Consistently with this constitutional background
106. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 11.
107. La. Act 170 of 1898, § 40, as amended by La. Act 171 of 1912, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8423].
108. La. Act 170 of 1898, §§ 30, 34 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8399, 8403]. The
tax collector is forbidden to receive the assessment rolls from the assessors
until they are approved by the Tax Commission or to collect any of the taxes
until authorized to do so by the Tax Commission. La. Act 140 of 1916, para-.
graph 3, as amended by La. Act 211 of 1918, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8321,
paragraph 3]: Vernon Parish Lumber Co. v. Word, 170 La. 580, 128 So. 522
(1930).
109. La. Act 136 of 1898, § 35 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5442]. Special pro-
visions on the subject are to be found in the various city charters. For the
parish of Orleans see La. Act 170 of 1898, § 31 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8400].
110. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 14.
111. La. Act 170 of 1898, § 53, as amended by La. Acts 315 of 1910, § 1, and
235 of 1928, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8441].
112. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 11.
113. Police Jury of Parish of Jefferson Davis v, Grace, 182 La. 64, 161 So.
22 (1935).
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the state auditor has been authorized to permit tax debtors to
redeem their property adjudicated to the state for delinquent
taxes at any time so long as the state has not disposed of the
lands.114
Here again the tax statutes have not kept pace with constitu-
tional change. The period of redemption was changed from one
to three years by constitutional amendment in 1932.119 The stat-
utes, however, still prescribe a form of tax sale advertisement,
which recites that the redemption period is one year, and provide
that the property shall be redeemable during one year from the
date of recordation of the deed.11 Obviously the constitutional
provision is controlling but the statutory discrepancy should not
be perpetuated.
In accordance with Section 11 of Article X of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1921, the legislature has provided a procedure for
confirming or quieting tax titles.117 Under the terms of this act the
tax purchaser may institute suit against the former proprietor of
the property, notifying him that the title will be confirmed unless
a proceeding to annul the sale is instituted within six months
from the date of service of the petition and citation. Such a suit
does not put at issue the validity of the tax title. It merely invites
an attack upon it, which may be made either by a separate, in-
dependent suit to annul the tax sale or by reconventional de-
mand.11 It has been held that the plaintiff may be permitted to
file an answer to the defendant's reconventional demand in a suit
to cancel a tax sale. 119
The institution of suit as just described is a means of serving
the notice of sale contemplated by Section 11 of Article X of the
Constitution. This notice may not be served until the time of re-
demption shall have expired. If never served suit to annul may
be brought at any time within five years of the date of record-
ation of the tax deed. 120
114. La. Act 170 of 1898, § 62, as amended by La. Acts 315 of 1910, § 6, 41
of 1912, § 1, 72 of 1928, § 1, and 175 of 1934, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 84661;
Charbonnet v. Forschler, 138 La. 280, 70 So. 224 (1915); St, Bernard Syndicate
v. Grace, 169 La. 666, 125 So. 848 (1930).
115. The proposed amendment was initiated by the legislature by Act 147
of 1932 and adopted by the voters November 8, 1932.
116. See La. Act 170 of 1898, § 53, as amended by La. Acts 315 of 1910, § 1,
and 235 of 1928, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8441] and La. Act 170 of 1898, § 63,
as amended by La. Act 228 of 1932, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8490].
117. La. Act 106 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8502].
118. Fellman v. Kay, 147 La. 953, 86 So. 406 (1920); Regina Lumber Co, v.
Perkins, 175 La. 15, 142 So. 785 (1932).
119. Green v. Thrash, 174 La. 56, 139 So. 757 (1932).
120. Under Section 11 of Article X of the Constitution no valid judgment
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If the tax debtor or his transferee remain in undisturbed
possession of the property sold, the courts have held, despite the
unqualified language of the governing provision in that respect,
that such possession is in continuous conflict with the claim of the
tax purchaser arising under his tax title and is a continuous
protest against the sale, and, consequently, the prescription or
peremption of three years does not run in favor of the holder of
the tax title.,2 The prescriptive or peremptive period is suspend-
ed, however, only when the owner remains in actual, corporeal
possession of the property adjudicated, either in person or through
tenants or co-owners; 12 2 mere civil or constructive possession re-
sulting from the registry of the title of the original owner will
not suffice to prevent the running of "prescription" in favor of
the tax purchaser.122
The courts have variously spoken of the period for bringing
a proceeding to annul a tax sale as a period of prescription 124 and
peremption, 1  and have even, by verbal misadventure, referred
to "pre-emption" in several cases. 126 This matter ought to be put
at rest. It is obviously consequential to the lawyer in preparing
pleadings and in reckoning the period in terms of possible inter-
ruption or suspension, as by minority.1 27
annulling a tax sale can be rendered until the price and all taxes and costs,
with ten per centum interest, are paid to the purchaser. The pertinent sen-
tence of this section reads: "No judgment annulling a tax sale shall have
effect until the price and all taxes and costs are [sic] paid, with ten per
cent per annum interest on the amount of the price and taxes paid from date
of respective payments, be previously paid to the purchaser .. " The queried
"are," which did not appear before this section was amended in 1932, was
obviously inserted through error and must be ignored to give the provision
meaning.
121. Carey v. Cagney, 109 La. 77, 33 So. 89 (1902); Bonvillain v. Richaud,
153 La. 431, 96 So. 21 (1923); Federico v. Nunez, 173 La. 957, 139 So. 18 (1931).
If the period of limitation is properly a period of peremption there could be
no suspension of the period, as in the case of prescription, by the original
owner's remaining in possession of the property.
122. Levenberg v. Shanks, 165 La. 419, 115 So. 641 (1928); Pill v. Morgan,
186 La. 329, 172 So. 409 (1936).
123. Baldwin Lumber Co. v. Dalferes, 138 La. 507, 70 So. 493 (1916); Com-
mercial Securities Co. v. Smith, 126 So. 97 (La. App. 1930).
124. Wall v. Hamner, 182 La. 1049, 162 So. 769 (1935); Skannal v. Hespeth,
196 La. 87, 198 So. 661 (1940); Ward v. South Coast Corp., 198 La. 433, 3 So.
(2d) 689 (1941).
125. Hollingsworth v. Schanland, 155 La. 825, 99 So. 613 (1924); Levenberg
v. Shanks, 165 La. 419, 115 So. 641 (1928); Federico v. Nunez, 173 La. 957, 139
So. 18 (1931); Jackson v. Irion, 196 La. 728, 200 So. 18 (1941).
126. Kivlen v. Horvath, 163 La. 901, 113 So. 140 (1927); Calcasieu Inv. Co.
v. Corbello's Heirs, 175 So. 101 (La. App. 1937).
127. However, it has been held that the prescription of three years, estab-
lished by the constitution, against actions to annul tax titles, applies to ac-
tions brought by minors, without depriving them of their property without
due process of law. Doyle v. Negrotto, 124 La. 100, 49 So. 992 (1909), cited with
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As we have seen, the constitutional redemption provision is
deemed inapplicable to adjudications to the state or other taxing
authority.128 Yet they are treated as within the scope of the pro-
vision fixing the period for annulment suits. 129 An explanation
would be helpful. So far as-appears on the face of the Constitu-
tion both provisions refer to the same kind of tax sales.
Doubtless enough has been said to indicate that our system
of property tax collection is due a thorough "going-over." This is
clear as a legal and administrative matter. Preliminary study
suggests policy aspects which invite thoughtful inquiry. Might
not some effective way be found to reduce the insecurity of tax
titles without unfairness to the tax delinquents? Should not a
tax policy which permits a large shift of land ownership from pri-
vate hands to the state through tax adjudications be reconsid-
ered? Why do we not give more thought to the problem of pro-
viding local government a relatively even flow of revenue by
means other than the costly system of borrowing in anticipation
of the collection of taxes, which our single, lump-payment plan of
tax collection forces us to employ?
THE SPECIAL TREATMENT OF ORLEANS PARISH
More than one-third of the total assessed values in the state is
to be found in Orleans Parish. This tremendous amount of tax-
able values is governed by a congeries of special statutes, which
give New Orleans a property tax calendar materially different
from that which is followed in the rest of the state and many spe-
cial variations in the total tax process.
We do not know to what extent this exceptional treatment of
the state's metropolitan parish is justified or desirable. We are not
prepared to comment on the special statutory provisions. We have
heard only faint rumblings as to the quality of tax administration
in that parish' and do not know the facts. We merely call atten-
tion to the situation with the suggestion that it should figure
approval in McNamara v. Marx, 136 La. 159, 66 So. 764 (1914). On the other
hand, Article 3543 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, which has been applied
to tax sales [Kent v. Brown, 38 La. Ann. 802 (1886); Stille v. Shull, 41 La. Ann.
816, 6 So. 634 (1889)], extends the period of prescription against informalities
in judicial sales from two years in the case of persons sui juris to five years
in the case of minors.
128. Note 113, supra.
129. See Chapman-Storm Lumber Co. v. Board of Com'rs for Atchafalaya
Basin Levee Dist., 196 La. 1039, 200 So. 455 (1941). This case involved a tax
adjudication governed by the Constitution of 1898 but we note no material
difference between that and the present constitution for instant purposes.
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prominently in any adequate reconsideration of property tax pol-
icy in Louisiana.
CONCLUSION
The reader may judge for himself the sufficiency of the fore-
going indictment of the Louisiana general property tax in its legal
and administrative aspects. We claim for it no artistry of form-
ulation; we ask merely that its substance be pondered. In our
view, to permit the present situation to continue year in and year
out, legislative session after legislative session, without more than
superficial consideration can and will reflect nothing but discredit
upon the state's political leadership, its bar and its better-informed
citizens in general. We are glad to have had the privilege of do-
ing a bit of spade-calling. At this writing we are not in a position
to do more. But there are others who can-if they but will.
